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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MARK PLASKON,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

CRAIG DEARDEN, Commissioner,
Department of Public Safety,
State of Utah; ROBERT
BRINKMAN, Bureau Chief, Crime
Laboratory, Department of
Public Safety, State of Utah;
and THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Case No, 20000066-CA

v.

Defendants/Appellees.

:
:

Priority No. 15

:
:

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is taken from an Order of Dismissal of the Third
Judicial District Court, filed December 20, 1999 (R. 138-39),
granting defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff!s claims of
defamation and interference with prospective economic relations
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(R. 38-39).

The claims arose from plaintiff's termination from

probationary state employment more than 11 years before he
initiated the present action.

Plaintiff filed a timely notice of

appeal from the Order of Dismissal on January 19, 2000 (R. 140).
By order of transfer from the Supreme Court of Utah dated May 18,
2 000, this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1996).

ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Plaintiff's appeal raises only the question whether the
district court erred in ruling that, under Retherford v. AT&T
Communications, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992), a "continuing wrong"
theory was inapplicable to plaintiff's cause of action for the
purpose of extending the relevant statute of limitations.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The applicability of a decided case to

the controversy before the trial court is a question of law,
reviewed for correctness.

4447 Assocs. v. First Sec. Fin., 1999

UT App 013, 1|9, 973 P.2d 992; see also State v. Montoya, 887 P.2d
857, 858 (Utah 1994); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918
P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996); Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 874 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1994).

Further, "[t]he propriety

of a dismissal based on Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a question of
law; therefore we review the district court's ruling for
correctness."

Stokes v. Wagoner, 1999 UT 94, 1(6, 987 P. 2d 602;

see also Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes,
and rules pertinent to the issue before the Court is contained in
the body of this brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition
Below
Plaintiff filed the original complaint in this lawsuit on

February 11, 1998 (R. 1-7), alleging causes of action in
defamation and "unlawful business interference" (R. 1, K 1 ) . The
complaint was not served on defendants.

On June 30, 1998, an

amended complaint was filed (R. 10-16), correcting an internal
inconsistency between paragraphs 2 and 10 of the original
complaint regarding the length of plaintiff's probationary
employment (compare R. 1-2, H 2, and 4, H 10; R. 10, f 2, and
12-13, % 10) and raising plaintiff's requests for compensatory
and punitive damages from one million to ten million dollars each
(R. 6 and 15, prayer for relief, Uf 3-4).

As

with the original

complaint, plaintiff failed to serve the amended complaint on
defendants, instead filing a second amended complaint on
September 23, 1998 (R. 17-23), which added a new paragraph.il
asserting that defendants had failed to advise him of rights to
the administrative review of his termination from employment and
that he had been found entitled to an award of employment
compensation over defendants' opposition (R. 20). Neglecting to
serve defendants with this second amended complaint, plaintiff
again amended the complaint on January 19, 1999 (R. 24-31), newly
alleging a claim based on the asserted public accessibility of
his employment records under the Governmental Records Access and
Management Act (GRAMA), Title 3, Chapter 62 of the Utah Code,

3

enacted some five years after plaintiff's termination (R. 29,
H 21). He made timely service of this third amended complaint on
defendants (R. 32-37) .
Defendants responded with a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
(R. 3 8-39), supported by a memorandum (R. 4 0-82).

The memorandum

pointed out various jurisdictional and procedural flaws in the
complaint in addition to identifying prior suits plaintiff had
litigated with respect to the same set of facts.

Following

plaintiff's response (R. 83-112) and supplemental briefing by
both parties (R. 123-27 (plaintiff) and 128-35 (defendants)), the
court entered its order of dismissal (R. 138-39) on December 20,
1999 "for the reasons set forth in Defendants' memoranda in
support and in reply" (R. 139).

Plaintiff filed a timely notice

of appeal on January 19, 2000 (R. 140).
B.

Statement of Relevant Facts
Plaintiff was hired to work as a questioned document

examiner in the Utah Department of Safety's crime laboratory,
where defendant Brinkman was his immediate supervisor (Third
Amended Complaint, R. 24, H 2.)

While plaintiff was still on

probationary status, he was repeatedly warned about problems with
his performance.

In a May 28, 1986 memorandum given to

plaintiff, which plaintiff refused to acknowledge by signing, Mr.
Brinkman noted that plaintiff had engaged in insubordination by
declining to follow specific instructions regarding his work
4

priorities (Exh. D to plaintiff's memorandum opposing motion to
dismiss, R. 95 and 110).

The memorandum also stated:

You have been talked to extensively in the past
for this behavior. This memo is to be considered a
written reprimand which will be placed in your
permanent personnel file.
This is also notice that should we experience this
behavior at any time in the future, it will be grounds
for dismissal.
R. 95 and 110. On June 23, 1986, plaintiff received an Employee
Performance Appraisal Form, which noted continuing performance
problems, including "lack of cooperation, sarcasm and resistence
to authority" (Exh. C to plaintiff's memorandum opposing motion
to dismiss, R. 93 and 108).
appraisal form.

Plaintiff refused to sign the

Plaintiff did not successfully complete his

probation, and prior to its expiration, he was advised by letter,
dated August 19, 1986 and served on him two days later, of his
termination from employment effective August 24, 1986 (Third
Amended Complaint, R. 26, % 10; Exh. B to plaintiff's memorandum
opposing motion to dismiss, R. 91-92 and 106-07) . The
termination was based on "numerous occasions" of counseling by
his supervisors "in the areas of relations with co-workers,
relations with your supervisors, the attitude which you display
toward your case work and conforming to the rules and policies of
the Laboratory and of the Department" (R. 91 and 106), as well as
on two "below standard" performance appraisals (id.).

The letter

correctly advised plaintiff that "[u]nder Utah law, there is no
appeal process for probationary employees" (id.).

5

On August 24, 1988, plaintiff filed a complaint in Third
District Court against the State of Utah, defendant Brinkman, and
John T. Nielson, then Commissioner of the Utah Department of
Public Safety ("DPS") (Exh. A to defendants' memorandum
supporting motion to dismiss, R. 52-59; see also Addendum A,
attached).

The case was dismissed without prejudice (R. 60). A

second suit with substantially identical allegations, also
brought in Third District Court, was filed on June 15, 1990
against the same defendants (Exh. B to defendants' memorandum
supporting motion to dismiss, R. 62-67; see also Addendum B,
attached), and was likewise dismissed without prejudice (R. 69)
for failure to serve.

On March 6, 1995, plaintiff filed suit in

federal district court, substituting Douglas Bodrero for John T.
Nielson as DPS Commissioner and amending the complaint before
service (see Addendum C, attached; see also Second Amended
Complaint, Civil No. 95CV210W, Exh. C to defendants' memorandum
supporting motion to dismiss, R. 73-79).

The complaint had the

same factual basis as the prior state complaints, but added an
allegation that unfair statements by defendants regarding his
work skills, made in documents contained in his personnel file,
prohibited him from obtaining employment with the Web€>r State
University Crime Laboratory (R. 78, K 20).

In addition to

defamation and unlawful interference claims, the federal suit
also raised a Title VII claim for discrimination in employment
(R. 73, 1 1 ) . The federal court dismissed all claims with
prejudice by order dated March 4, 1997 (see Exh. C to defendants'
6

memorandum supporting motion to dismiss, R. 80), reaffirming by
subsequent order the merit of defendants' articulated grounds for
dismissal and denying plaintiff's request for a non-prejudicial
dismissal of his state causes of action (R. 80-81).

No appeal

was taken from this final order.
The present lawsuit ensued.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff seeks to avoid the multiple procedural and
jurisdictional defects of his suit by invoking a continuing
violation theory based on Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844
P.2d 949 (Utah 1992)

In Retherford, the Supreme Court of Utah

reversed summary judgment for defendants on statute of
limitations grounds in an action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.

The court held that because of the

cumulative nature of retaliatory harassment, it could not rule as
a matter of law that Retherford's cause of action accrued at the
time she first complained of her coworkers' retaliatory actions,
which was beyond the applicable statute of limitations.

The

court focused on the subjective nature of the element of
plaintiff's extreme emotional distress and the difficulty in
establishing the time of its accrual, observing that the leave of
absence she ultimately took as a result of defendants' ongoing
acts of harassment fell within the limitations period.

By

contrast, no such subjective element is present in the case at
bar.

Plaintiff's cause of action accrued, at the latest, when he
7

was made aware of unfavorable reports and reviews or when he was
terminated on the grounds they documented.

Plaintiff has

articulated no reason to extend the four-year general statute of
limitations to more than a decade after these events took place.
Moreover, the claims made in the present suit have already
been litigated to decision on the merits by the parties or their
privies in plaintiff's federal lawsuit, which resulted in a
dismissal with prejudice of all claims.

Res judicata prevents

their relitigation here.
Finally, plaintiff has not followed the strictures of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act in commencing his action.

Under

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1997), the act requires that a notice
of claim be filed within one year of the asserted cause of
action.

The claim is deemed denied if no contrary action is

taken within 90 days.

If plaintiff relies on his original notice

of claim, allegedly filed on or before August 24, 1987 (R. 56,
H 16), then the present suit has not been timely commenced within
one year of the claim's denial or deemed denial.

If, instead,

plaintiff relies on his allegedly amended notice of claim dated
August 21, 1998 (R. 96-97 and 111-12), x the notice falls outside
the one-year period measured from the time the cause of action

X

A June 26, 1997 notice of claim purportedly attached to the
original, amended, and second amended complaints does not appear
of record. Moreover, since the third amended complaint, the only
one served on defendants, does not refer to it, it is not at
issue in the present appeal. Additionally, plaintiff's
memorandum opposing defendants' motion to dismiss specifically
relies on and attaches only the amended notice of claim dated
August 21, 1998. In any event, neither date would be timely.
8

arose.

Moreover, the present suit was commenced with the filing

of the original complaint on February 11, 1998, fully six months
before the date of the amended notice and therefore in violation
of statute.

Plaintiff has articulated no argument addressing

these determinative procedural and jurisdictional errors.
As noted in defendants1 memorandum supporting their motion
to dismiss, plaintiff's complaint, read broadly, may have
attempted to articulate claims under various other legal
theories, including employment discrimination under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, disability discrimination, civil
rights violations under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Supp. 2000), and even
constitutional due process violations (see R. 43-46) .
Defendants' arguments for the dismissal of these possible claims
were adopted by the district court in its order granting
dismissal "for the reasons set forth in Defendants' memoranda in
support and in reply" (R. 13 9) and stand as independent grounds
supporting the court's decision.

Because plaintiff has failed to

address these issues, they are deemed waived for purposes of
appeal and will not be further addressed in this brief.
Plaintiff admits that his reliance on Retherford is placed
solely on dicta contained in a footnote (see Aplt. Brief at 7 ) .
Given the multiple grounds supporting the district court's
decision, plaintiff's argument is too slender a reed to bear the
weight of reversal.

9

ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFF'S SUIT IS BARRED BY JURISDICTIONAL AND
PROCEDURAL ERRORS UNDER THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
ACT.
"The proper interpretation and application of a statute is a
question of law which [the appellate court] review[s] for
correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal
conclusions."

Gutierrez v.' Medley, 972 P. 2d 913, 914-15 (Utah

1998); see also State v. Martin, 1999 UT App 062, 1|7, 976 P.2d
1224.

The trial court correctly adopted defendants' contention

that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act barred plaintiff's
claims, and plaintiff has mounted no argument to the contrary.
Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint states, "This is an
action for defamation and unlawful business interference" (R. 24,
Hi).

The complaint names as defendants Craig Dearden,

Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety; Robert
Brinkman, Bureau Chief of the Department's crime laboiratory; and
the State of Utah.

Because the articulated claims lie against

the State--a governmental entity as defined in Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-2 (1997 and Supp. 1999)--and its employees, acting within
the scope of their employment, the case is governed by the
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Plaintiff has not argued that the act does not control his
case.2

In fact, his first three complaints in this case

2

"Issues not briefed by an appellant are deemed waived and
abandoned." American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mechanical,
Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1185 n.5 (Utah 1996); see also Pixton v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah App.
10

specifically invoke the act by stating that "[o]n or about June
26, 1997, a notice of claim against the State of Utah was filed,
a copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof by
reference" (R. 6, 15, and 22, % 21) .3 Moreover, he has not
alleged that the defendant employees acted with fraud or malice,
the only grounds on which he could bring an action against them
other than under the Governmental Immunity Act, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. 63-30-4(3) (1997).

His sole identification of

defendants is in their capacities as employees of the state
(R. 24, H i ) .
Section 63-30-3(1) of the act provides governmental entities
immunity from suit for, among other things, "any injury which
results from the exercise of a governmental function."
Ann. § 63-30-3(1) (1997).

Utah Code

The act defines a governmental

function as
any act, failure to act, operation, function, or
undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the
act, failure to act, operation, function, or
undertaking is characterized as governmental,
proprietary, a core government function, unique to
government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to
or not essential to a government or governmental
function, or could be performed by private enterprise
or private persons.

1991) ("Generally, where an appellant fails to brief an issue on
appeal, the point is waived").
3

See n.l, supra. No such attachment appears in the district
court record. However, plaintiff does provide an "Amended Notice
of Claim Against Government Entity" dated August 21, 1998 as
Exhibit E to his memorandum opposing defendants1 motion to
dismiss (R. 96-97 and 111-12). The memorandum contains no
reference to a notice of claim dated June 26, 1997.
11

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a) (1997 and Supp. 1999).
Additionally, "[a] 'governmental function1 may be performed by
any department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a
governmental entity.11

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2 (4) (b) (1997 and

Supp. 1999) .
Section 63-30-10 (1997) retains immunity for injuries caused
by employees' negligent acts or omissions, including '"libel,
slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of
mental anguish, or violation of civil rights."
§ 63-30-10(2) (1997).

Utah Code Ann.

It likewise retains immunity for "a

misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent
or intentional."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(6) (1997).

Plaintiff's allegations of defendants' false and misleading
statements and defamation, all of which plaintiff asserts have
prevented him from obtaining employment in his chosen field,
clearly fit within these categories.

Because immunity for these

actions is retained, plaintiff's defamation-based claims could
not go forward under the act even if plaintiff had complied with
all procedural and jurisdictional requirements of the immunity
act.

However, he did not do so.
Both statute and precedent make clear that a timely notice

of claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit under the act.
Section 63-30-12 states that
[a] claim against the state, or against its employee
for an act or omission occurring during the performance
of [his/the employee's] duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority, is barred
unless notice of claim is filed with the [relevant
authorities] within one year after the claim arises, or
12

before any extension of time granted under Section
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function
giving rise to the claim is characterized as
governmental.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1997 and Supp. 1999).

As the supreme

court has consistently held, failure to give the required notice
is grounds for dismissal.

See Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999

UT 36, Kl8# 977 P.2d 1201 ("To bring suit against a governmental
entity for an injury, a party must file a written notice of claim
with that entity.

Failure to file such notice deprives the court

of subject matter jurisdiction") (citation omitted); see also
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988).

This Court

applied the supreme court's Madsen holding in Lamarr v. Utah
State Department of Transportation, 828 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah App.
1992), citing to Madsen and stating, "[T]he supreme court has
held the statutory notice requirement is a jurisdictional
requirement and a precondition to suit."
Once a timely notice of claim has been filed, Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-14 (1997) gives a governmental entity 90 days in which to
approve or deny it.

If no action is taken within that period,

the claim is deemed denied.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15(2)

(1997), a suit following this denial period must be commenced
within one year of its expiration.
Plaintiff's original notice of claim, allegedly filed "on or
before August 24, 1987" (R. 56), was timely as to his 1986
termination.

However, it cannot serve to sustain the present

suit, filed nearly a decade later, well past the one-year statute
of limitations.

The alleged notice of June 26, 1997 (see R. 6,
13

15, and 22, t 21) appears nowhere of record, even though
plaintiff claims to have attached it to his original, first
amended, and second amended complaints in this action.,

Moreover,

the complaint at issue here, the Third Amended Complaint, does
not refer to it.

The amended notice plaintiff claims to have

filed on August 21, 1998 (R. 96-97 and 111-12) is based on events
that took place in 1986 and is therefore not timely.

Even if it

were timely as to the claims asserted therein, it does not
satisfy the precondition requirement because this suit was
commenced by the filing of the original complaint more than six
months before the date of the amended notice.

Plaintiff has not

cited, and defendants1 research has not disclosed, any authority
suggesting that a default of timely notice can be cured by notice
given subsequent to the initiation of a legal action.

In fact,

under Rushton, even " [a]ctual notice does not cure a party's
failure to meet these [notice] requirements."

Rushton, 1999 UT

36, i[l9; see also Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666, 672 n.9 (Utah
App. 1994); Litster v. Utah Valley Community College, 881 P.2d
933, 938 (Utah App. 1994).

To accept a tardy notice of claim

would gut the very purpose of notice:

"to provide the

governmental entity an opportunity to correct the condition that
caused the injury, evaluate the claim, and perhaps settle the
matter without the expense of litigation."

Larson v. Park City

Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345-46 (Utah 1998); see also Bellonio
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Utah App. 1996).

14

In short, the deficiencies of plaintiff's pleadings, as
revealed in the record, fully support the district court's
dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.

Whether or not the court

relied on these particular grounds for its order of dismissal,
they are also sufficient for affirmance of the district court's
decision.4
II. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY BOTH THE CLAIM
PRECLUSION AND ISSUE PRECLUSION BRANCHES OF RES
JUDICATA.
Plaintiff suggests that the case at bar stands in the same
procedural posture as Retherford.

He correctly states that the

Retherford court "dismissed the Federal claims with prejudice, as
being untimely, and dismissed the State claims without prejudice
for lack of pendant [sic] jurisdiction" (Aplt. Brief at 5-6). He
then cautions the Court to "note that this procedural history is
very similar to the present case" (id. at 6 ) . A review of the
series of lawsuits plaintiff has pursued with respect to the
facts that underlie this case shows otherwise.
Plaintiff initially filed suit in Third District Court in
1988 (R. 52-59 and Addendum A, attached).

The complaint was not

served on defendants and was subsequently dismissed without
prejudice (R. 60). He filed a second case in Third District
Court in 1990, which he again failed to serve (R. 62-67 and
4

A reviewing court "may affirm a trial court's decision on
any reasonable legal basis, provided that any rationale for
affirmance finds support in the record." State v. Heaton, 958
P.2d 911, 916 (Utah 1998); see also White v. Deseelhorst, 879
P.2d 1371, 1376 (Utah 1994) ("[W]e may affirm the judgment on any
ground, even one not relied upon by the trial court").
15

Addendum B, attached).

This suit was likewise dismissed without

prejudice (R. 59) for failure to serve defendants.

In 1995, he

filed a third action, this time in federal district court
(R. 73-79 and Addendum C, attached), making service on
defendants, who filed a motion to dismiss (see Addendum C,
entries for December 30, 1996) . The motion was granted and all
claims were dismissed with prejudice (see R. 80). The federal
court subsequently denied plaintiff's motion to set aside the
dismissal with prejudice as to the state claims, finding no
grounds that would justify such action and reaffirming the
grounds for dismissal as meritorious (R. 81). Plaintiff took no
appeal from the court's decision.

Consequently, the decision

operates as an adjudication on the merits of the case,5 barring
the present claims as res judicata.6

"The application of res

judicata is a question of law, reviewed for correctness with no
deference given to the trial court."

J.M. v. State, 1999 UT App

238, 1115, 986 P.2d 115; see also State, Office of Recovery Servs,
v. V.G.P.. 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah App. 1992).
5

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b): "Unless the court in its order
for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision [involuntary dismissal] and any dismissal not
provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party
under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits."
Plaintiff has not argued that any of these exceptions apply to
the dismissal of his federal case. His state claims, therefore,
were dismissed on the merits, activating the doctrine of res
judicata.
6

As with the issue of the Governmental Immunity Act's
procedural and jurisdictional requisites, the issue of res
judicata has not been briefed by appellant and is therefore
waived for purposes of appeal. See n.2, supra.
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The term "res judicata" comprises two distinct legal
doctrines:

claim preclusion and issue preclusion.

Under the

first branch,
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action only if
the suit in which that cause of action is being
asserted and the prior suit satisfy three requirements.
First, both cases must involve the same parties or
their privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be
barred must have been presented in the first suit or
must be one that could and should have been raised in
the first action. Third, the first suit must have
resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Madsen, 769 P.2d at 247.

In issue preclusion, or collateral

estoppel,
the adjudication of an issue bars its relitigation in
another action only if four requirements are met.
First, the issue in both cases must be identical.
Second, the judgment must be final with respect to that
issue. Third, the issue must have been fully, fairly,
and competently litigated in the first action. Fourth,
the party who is precluded from litigating the issue
must be either a party to the first action or a privy
of a party.
Id. at 250.
In this case, both branches of res judicata are satisfied.
The plaintiff here was also the plaintiff in the federal case and
is the party who is to be precluded from relitigating his state
claims.

The State and Robert Brinkman, defendants here, were

also defendants in the federal case.

The third federal

defendant, Douglas Bodrero, preceded present defendant Craig
Dearden as Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety
and these parties are consequently in privity.

The state claims

presented in the federal case are virtually identical to the
claims raised in the case at bar:
17

"an action for defamation and

unlawful interference with Plaintiff's ability to pursue his
chosen profession" (R. 73, f 1) based on the allegation "[t]hat
subsequent to the Plaintiff leaving employment with the State of
Utah, he has attempted to obtain employment in the area of crime
scene investigation, document examination and other forensic
fields and has consistently been denied employment based upon the
false reports generated from the Defendants" (R. 28, % 17
(present suit); R. 78, H 18 (federal suit)).

Even the most

recent instance of alleged defamation and interference with
prospective employment, the denial of employment with the crime
laboratory at Weber State University in 1995, is the same in both
cases (see R. 28-29, H 19 (present suit); R. 78, H 20 (federal
suit)).

In their allegations that plaintiff has "consistently

been denied employment" on the basis of defendants1 statements
(R. 28, H 17 (present suit); R. 78, K 18)), both suits allege an
ongoing violation.

The parties fully litigated these state

issues to conclusion on the merits in the federal suit, as
explained above, and a decision on the merits was rendered in
defendants1 favor, from which plaintiff took no appeal.

Even if

they had not been so litigated, the factual similarities in the
two cases show that the state issues could have and should have
been raised in the federal case.

Given the identity of the

parties, facts, and issues, plaintiff cannot escape the
application of res judicata to his claims here.
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III. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ARTICULATED A "CONTINUING
WRONG" THAT WOULD SUPPORT JURISDICTION OF HIS CLAIMS.
Plaintiff's sole argument for the timeliness of his claims
is based on a footnote in Retherford which he acknowledges in his
brief "is dicta and is not a part of the holding of the case, and
therefore the case does not provide any precedential value for
this Court" (Aplt. Brief at 7).

In light of the procedural,

jurisdictional, and res judicata hurdles that plaintiff has
failed to overcome, this argument cannot support the weight of
reversal.
The Retherford court suggested three factors to be
considered in determining the existence of a continuing
violation:
permanence.

(1) subject matter, (2) frequency, and (3)
See 844 P.2d at 976 n.18.

The circumstances of

plaintiff's case do not fulfill these criteria.
As to subject matter, the inquiry involves whether all
alleged acts involve the same type of discrimination.

Plaintiff

has alleged no discrete acts since his denial of employment by
the Weber State University Crime Laboratory in 1995 that have
resulted in discrimination against him.

He argues only that

"[o]bviously Petitioner's allegations of disseminating untrue
information about him over a period of years qualifies" (Aplt.
Brief at 7).

He has identified neither specific statements nor

specific parties to whom such statements were disclosed after the
1995 incident, which was litigated to conclusion on the merits in
his prior federal case.

Relying only on the 1995 incident

subjects his complaint to dismissal for lack of a timely notice
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of claim and on grounds of res judicata, as discussed in Points I
and II, above.
Petitioner fares no better with the frequency factor.

His

complete argument, after asserting that the factor favors his
position, is as follows:

"They are not isolated incidents, but

continuing incidents that extend over a number of years of making
his file available through GRAMMA [sic] and other reporting
services so that any potential employer could review the
documents" (Aplt. Brief at 7 ) . Again, these allegedly
"continuing incidents" are unidentified other than the
asserted--and litigated--1995 disclosure to Weber State
University.

Moreover, there is no evidence of record that

negative documents were added to his personnel file subsequent to
his separation from state employment in 1986--some five years
before the Governmental Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA)
became effective in 1991.

The continuing existence of negative

documents, especially in the absence of demonstrated new
publication, cannot sustain a finding of frequency simply on the
basis of continued availability.
Russell v. McMillen, a case cited to support the application
of a "continuing wrong" theory in Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d
1357, 1377-78 (Utah App. 1993) (Orme, J., concurring in the
result), is instructive on this point.

Russell was a Colorado

libel case in which a series of newspaper articles, published
beginning on October 6, 1976, allegedly libeled the plaintiff.
The Colorado Court of Appeals recognized that "[a] cause of
20

action in libel accrues when the defamatory statements are
published.

And, each separate publication constitutes a separate

and distinct claim for libel."
255, 258 (Colo. App. 1984).

Russell v. McMillen, 685 P.2d

Nonetheless, the court held

Russell's claims barred as to the 1976 articles by his failure to
file his libel complaint within the one-year statute of
limitations.

The mere existence and presumably continuing

availability of the 1976 articles to public scrutiny did not
render the violation "continuing" as to those articles for
limitations purposes.

Plaintiff's situation is similar.

He had

an opportunity to challenge the allegedly defamatory documents
when he first became aware of them, or, at the latest, when he
became aware in 1995 that they were being disclosed to
prospective employers.

See R. 28-29, H 19, in which plaintiff

admits that in the process of applying for employment with Weber
State University, he
was advised that reports emanating from the Defendants
question his competence, his integrity and his ability
to work with people, all of which serve to perpetuate
an unfair and invalid profile of the Plaintiff, which
in the highly competitive area of criminalistic, [sic]
prohibits him from obtaining employment and has thus
far prohibited him from obtaining employment at the
Weber State University Crime Lab.
Just as the continuing availability of the newspaper articles to
public scrutiny did not save Russell's action, the continued
availability of plaintiff's personnel file does not constitute a
"continuing wrong" that overcomes the relevant statute of
limitations.
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In the Retherford court's three-factor analysis, "[t]he
third factor, perhaps of most importance, is degree of
permanence."

Retherford, 844 P.2d at 976 n.18 (quoting Berry v.

Board of Supervisors, 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir. 1983)).

The

relevant inquiry is as follows:
Does the act have the degree of permanence which should
trigger an employeefs awareness of and duty to assert
his or her rights, or which should indicate to the
employee that the continued existence of the adverse
consequences of the act is to be expected without being
dependent on a continuing intent to discriminate?
Id.

While plaintiff disavows knowledge of the contents of his

personnel file until "two years ago" (Aplt. Brief at 7 ) , he has
not addressed his own representation that he was aware of
negative documents in his file that were made available to Weber
State University in 1995.

Under the Retherford dicta, this event

should have put him on notice that the continued existence of the
documents could be expected to result in adverse consequences
regardless of a continued discriminatory intent on defendants'
part.

Plaintiff's August 21, 1998 notice of claim was untimely

with respect to this factor, and, as explained in detail above,
requires dismissal of his suitRetherford simply does not support the result plaintiff
wishes to reach:

an avoidance of the statute of limitations

despite his demonstrated prior awareness of his asserted harm.
Plaintiff admits that Retherford is not of precedential value in
his suit.

Defendants submit that even if the Court were inclined

to adopt the dicta contained in Retherford's footnote 18, the
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facts of the case at bar neither compel nor justify its
application here.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a "continuing wrong"
that would warrant an extension of the statute of limitations in
his case.

There is no subjective element in his claims that

would require determination by a trier of fact.

The uncontested,

objective facts, as pleaded by plaintiff, show that he was aware
of defendants' statements as long ago as the time of his
termination from state employment in 1986.

He was certainly

aware of their dissemination by 1995, when he was rejected for
employment by the Weber State University Crime Laboratory, and,
in fact, litigated the matter to decision on the merits in
federal district court.

He cannot now be heard to claim, on the

same factual basis, that he was unaware of the permanent
implications of defendants' statements.

Nor can he escape his

own failures to follow the procedural requirements of the
Governmental Immunity Act in order to protect his rights.
The record supports the district court's dismissal of
plaintiff's action on multiple grounds which plaintiff's
rationale does not overcome.

For this reason, as more fully

explained above, defendants respectfully request the Court to
affirm the trial court's dismissal of this case.
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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION
Defendants/appellees believes the law is sufficiently clear
that neither oral argument nor a published opinion is necessary
in this case.

However, they wish to participate if oral argument

is ordered by the Court.

Dated this

«fl£^

day of July, 2000.

Nancy L,\ Kemp
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees
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--
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Minute entry:, terminated deadlines It is the order of
the court that defendant file an answer by 12/10/96. :
Tena Campbell Court Reporter: Ray Fenlon Court Deputy:
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Motion by Douglas Bodrero, Robert Brinkman, St UT to
dismiss amd cmp (mjm) [Entry date 12/31/96]

12/30/96 12

Memorandum by Douglas Bodrero, Robert Brinkman, St UT
support of [11-1] motion to dismiss amd cmp (mjm)
[Entry date 12/31/96]
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13

Affidavit of J. Mark Ward (ksj) [Entry date 01/06/97]
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14
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3/10/97 16

Motion by Douglas Bodrero, Robert Brinkman, St UT for
sanctions under rule 11 FRCP (ksj) [Entry date 03/11/97]
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Motion by Mark Plaskon to set aside judgment: [15-1]
order (ksj)
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[Entry date 04/07/97]
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[11-1] motion to dismiss amd cmp (ksj)
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